TORTS-CHARITABLE

IMMUNITY-EXCEPTION

FOR

NEGLIGENT

HIRING DOES NOT EXIST UNDER NEW JERSEY'S CHARITABLE

IMMUNITY AcT-Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 95 N.J.

530, 472 A.2d 531 (1984).
On October 27, 1980, Mr. and Mrs. Richard E. Schultz filed
a complaint against the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark.'
The complaint stated that their eleven-year-old son, Christopher,
had been a student at the Assumption School in Emerson, New
Jersey, and that the Assumption School was owned and operated
by the Archdiocese. 2 In addition, it was alleged that the Archdiocese had arranged for the Franciscan Brothers of the Poor to supply instructors for the school, and the Franciscan Brothers had in
turn employed Robert Coakley as a teacher and as scoutmaster
for the parish boy scout troop.
In July of 1978, Christopher Schultz attended a boy scout
camp in Forestport, New York,4 which was sponsored by the defendant and operated by Robert Coakley. 5 The plaintiffs' complaint charged that, during the summer of 1978, Robert Coakley,
also known as Brother Edmund,6 continually forced Christopher
to engage in deviant homosexual activities. 7 Coakley also
threatened to kill Christopher if he disclosed what had happened.8 When school began in the fall of 1978, Coakley continI Complaint at 1, Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, No. L-12608-80 (N.J.
Super. Ct., Law Div. 1981), aff'd, No. A-04606-80-TO1 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div.
1982), aft'd, 95 N.J. 530, 472 A.2d 531 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Complaint].
Richard E. Schultz sued in his capacity as administrator of the estate of his son,
Christopher Schultz, and as the father and natural guardian of his other son, Richard Schultz. Id. In addition, Richard E. and Margaret Schultz sued in their individual capacities. Id.
2
3
4
5

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3. The camp was known as the Pine Creek Reservation. Id.
Id.; Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 95 N.J. 530, 532, 472 A.2d 531,

532 (1984).
6

Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 95 N.J. 530, 532, 472 A.2d 531, 532

(1984).
See Complaint, supra note 1, at 3-4. The complaint stated that
Coakley required . . . Christopher Schultz to swim in the nude; provided him with pornographic magazines and materials; provided him
with provocative underwear, which he was required to wear; and engaged in direct physical contact with [Christopher]. This involved
[Christopher] manually masterbating [sic] Coakley and engaging in
other improper sexual activities.
Id. In addition, Coakley forced Christopher to sleep in Coakley's private trailer and
forced Christopher "to undergo simulated rape scenes." Id. at 4.
8 Id.
7
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ued to sexually molest Christopher 9 until the boy was mentally
unable to keep the events secret.'" Christopher told his parents
about what had transpired, and they immediately informed the
Archdiocese."
As a result of his traumatic experiences, Christopher was
hospitalized during the winter and spring of 1979, and received
extensive medical and psychiatric treatment.' 2 The Archdiocese
notified Christopher's parents that it would help defer medical
expenses, provided that the matter was not made public. 13 Near
the end of May 1979, however, Christopher committed suicide by
ingesting a fatal dosage of drugs.' 4
In their suit against the Archdiocese, the plaintiffs claimed
that the defendant had been "reckless, careless, and negligent in
hiring Coakley and permitting him to have young boys under his
care."' 5 The Schultzes sought damages for Christopher's death
and suffering and for the medical expenses and emotional suffering of their other son, Richard, who had attended the same boy
scout camp and who felt partially responsible for Christopher's

death. 16
The Archdiocese filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and
requested summary judgment in its favor.' 7 The essence of the
defendant's motion was that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs'
claim was barred by the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act.'"
9 Id. at 4-5. More specifically, the complaint alleged that "(a) Coakley used a
vibrator upon [Christopher] in the basement of the Friary; and (b) Coakley compelled [Christopher] to engage in sado-masochistic activities, including bondage,
and later required him to beat Coakley with a rope." Id.
10 See id. at 5.
11 Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 95 N.J. 530, 532, 472 A.2d 531, 532
(1984).
12

Id.

13 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 6.
14 Id. at 6; Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 95 N.J. 530, 532, 472 A.2d

531, 532 (1984).
15 Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 95 N.J. 530, 532, 472 A.2d 531, 532
(1984).
16 Id.; Complaint, supra note 1, at 8-9. The third count of the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Christopher's brother, Richard Schultz, had also been sexually
abused by Coakley. Id. Among other things, Coakley had asked Richard to pose for
photographs while dressed only in a cloth; Coakley "enter[ed] into deviant sexual
conversation" with Richard; and Coakley would masturbate in Richard's presence.
Id. at 9. Richard Schultz was 13 years old at the time of Coakley's advances. Id.
17 Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 95 N.J. 530, 532-33, 472 A.2d 531,
532 (1984).
18 See id. at 533, 472 A.2d at 532. New Jersey's Charitable Immunity Act provides, in pertinent part:
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The trial court granted the defendant's motion and the Schultzes
appealed, arguing, inter alia,19 that an exception to the Charitable
Immunity Act existed for situations in which a charitable institution was negligent in selecting its employees.2 " After the appellate division agreed that the plaintiffs' claim was barred, the New
Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to determine whether
a valid cause of action could be maintained.2 1 In Schultz v. Roman
Catholic Archdiocese, 2 a divided supreme court affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that the Charitable Immunity
Act prevented the Archdiocese from being held liable for negligent hiring.23
The notion that a charitable organization should be immunized from liability for the negligent acts of its employees developed from early English case law which characterized certain
public associations as trusts created for the common good. 24 Because of that concept, it was considered inappropriate to invade
the "trusts' " funds for a reason unconnected with the intended
public purpose. 25 In the mid-nineteenth century, however, the
No nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes shall,
except as is hereinafter set forth, be liable to respond in damages to any
person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of any agent or
servant of such corporation, society or association, where such person is
a beneficiary, to whatever degree, of the works of such nonprofit corporation, society or association; provided, however, that such immunity
from liability shall not extend to any person who shall suffer damage
from the negligence of such corporation, society, or association or of its
agents or servants where such person is one unconcerned in and unrelated to and outside of the benefactions of such corporation, society or
association; but nothing herein contained shall be deemed to exempt
the said agent or servant individually from their liability for any such
negligence.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985).
19 The appellants also contended that the Charitable Immunity Act violated the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and article 1, paragraph 1
of the New Jersey Constitution. Brief and Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1822, Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, No. A-04606-80-TOI (N.J. Super. Ct.,
App. Div. 1982), aft'd, 95 N.J. 530, 472 A.2d 531 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief
for Plaintiffs-Appellants, App. Div.].
20 See id. at 10-13.
21 See Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 95 N.J. 530, 533, 472 A.2d 531,
532 (1984).
22 95 N.J. 530, 472 A.2d 531 (1984).
23 Id. at 539, 472 A.2d at 536.
24 See, e.g., Holliday v. Vestry of the Parish of St. Leonard, Shoreditch, 142 Eng.
Rep. 769 (C.P. 1861); Feoffees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (H.L.
1846); Duncan v. Findlater, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (H.L. 1839).
25 See, e.g., Feoffees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508, 1510 (H.L.
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English courts rejected the trust-related theory of nonliability
and held that a public corporation could be held liable for the
wrongful acts of its servants.2 6
The year 1876 marked the first time that an American court
was presented with a negligence suit filed against a charitable organization. 2 7 In McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital,28 the
plaintiff entered the defendant hospital with a fractured leg and
received gratuitous medical care. 2 ' The plaintiff later claimed
that the attending physicians had been negligent. 30 The court
characterized the defendant as a "charitable institution," which
derived its funds from grants and donations. 3 ' All of the defendant's financial resources thus were said to be held in trust for the
purpose of "sustaining the hospital and increasing its benefit to
the public."' 32 Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff could
not recover damages from the hospital's funds based on the negligence of individual physicians.3 3 The court cited Holliday v. Vestry of the Parish of St. Leonard, Shoreditch 4 for the proposition that a
hospital's only duty was to "use due and reasonable care in the
selection of its agents." 3 5 If that responsibility was fulfilled, the
McDonald court observed, liability against the charitable entity for
the negligent acts of its agents could not lie. 6
In reaching its decision, the McDonald court apparently was
unaware that Holliday had been effectively overruled by the English courts and that
the underlying "trust" rationale had been
similarly rejected. 3 Eight years after McDonald, in Perry v. House of
1846) (allowing damages to be paid from funds establishing hospital "would be a
direct violation . . . of the purposes of a trust").
26 See Mersey Docks and Harbour Bd. v. Gibbs, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500, 1513-14,
1518 (H.L. 1866) (rejecting rationale of Duncan v. Findlater, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (H.L.
1839), and holding that "[i]t is much more reasonable... that the trust or corporate property should be amenable to the individual injured"); see also Foreman v.
Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of Canterbury, 6 L.R.-QB. 214, 217-18 (1871)
(stating that Holliday v. Vestry of the Parish of St. Leonard, Shoreditch, 142 Eng.
Rep. 769 (C.P. 1861), was overruled by Mersey Docks).
27 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 434 (1876).
28 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
29 McDonald, 120 Mass. at 432-33.
30 Id. at 433.
31 Id. at 434.
32 Id. at 435.
33 See id. at 436.
34 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (C.P. 1861).
35 McDonald, 120 Mass. at 436.
36 See id.
37 See President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810,
816 (D.C. Cir. 1942); see also supra note 26.
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Refuge, 38 another American court relied erroneously upon overruled English case law. 39 The Perry court held that damages could
not be recovered against a charitable organization, even if its employee had assaulted the claimant intentionally.40
The issue of whether a hospital could be held liable for the
negligent act of a physician or nurse was first addressed by a New
Jersey court in 1925. 4 ' The plaintiff in D'Amato v. Orange Memorial
Hospital4 2 fractured her kneecap when a nurse attempted to move
her from a wheelchair to a hospital bed. 43 The plaintiff sued the
hospital, claiming that the nurse had been negligent."4 The Court
of Errors and Appeals noted that other jurisdictions were split
with respect to the issue. 4 5 After discussing several cases that
supported nonliability, 46 however, the court held that "public
policy requires that a charitable institution . . be held not liable
for injuries resulting to patients through the negligence or carelessness of its physicians and nurses."' 47 The court was careful to
point out, however, that it was not deciding whether a charitable
institution might be liable "if carelessness were shown in the se'
lection of the agent responsible for the injury. 48
The next major development in New Jersey's common law
doctrine of charitable immunity occurred in Simmons v. Wiley
Methodist Episcopal Church."9 In that case, the Court of Errors and
Appeals addressed the issue of whether a charitable association
could be held liable for the negligence of its employees when the
63 Md. 20 (1889).
See id. at 26-28.
See id. at 28.
41 D'Amato v. Orange Memorial Hosp., 101 N.J.L. 61, 127 A. 340 (1925).
42 101 N.J.L. 61, 127 A. 340 (1925).
43 Id. at 62, 127 A. at 340.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 63, 127 A. at 341.
46 The D Amato court first discussed Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211
N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), which it considered "the leading case" supporting
nonliability. DAmato, 101 N.J.L. at 63-64, 127 A. at 341. In addition, the D Amato
court discussed McDonald. Id. at 64, 127 A. at 341.
47 D'Amato, 101 N.J.L. at 65, 127 A. at 341.
48 Id.
49 112 N.J.L. 129, 170 A. 237 (1934). In between the NewJersey Court of Errors and Appeals's decisions in D'Amato and Simmons, the New Jersey Supreme
Court extended the immunity created in D Amato to cover injuries to persons visiting hospital patients. See Boekel v. Orange Memorial Hosp., 108 N.J.L. 453, 158 A.
832 (1932), aff'd, 110 N.J.L. 509, 166 A. 146 (1933). In addition, the issue
presented to the Simmons court, see infra text accompanying note 49, was previously
decided by a county trial court. See Daniels v. Rahway Hosp., 10 N.J. Misc. 585,
160 A. 644 (Union County Ct. 1932).
38

39
40
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plaintiff was a "stranger" to the charity, i.e., one who did not
stand in a beneficial relation to the charitable institution .5 ° Basing its decision on public policy, the Simmons court held that immunity did not extend to suits brought by strangers to the
charity. 5 ' In the words of the court, "[t]o hold otherwise would
be to acquiesce in the careless selection of servants, and in the
carelessness of those selected, . . . a proposition repugnant to

one's sense of justice. "52
Further refinement of the charitable immunity doctrine took
place in 1939. 5 3 In Bianchi v. South Park PresbyterianChurch,54 New
Jersey's high court was faced with a situation in which the plaintiff
had fallen down a flight of stairs after one of the defendant's employees had negligently turned off the lights.5 5 The accident occurred in a house that was used as a social center by the
defendant church.5 6 Although the plaintiff was a member of a girl
scout troop that used the house without charge, she was not a
member of the church's congregation.5 7 Nevertheless, the court
characterized the plaintiff as the recipient of "incidental philanthropy,"' 58 and it held that she was a "beneficiary" in the legal
sense of the word. 59 After stating the general rule that eleemosynary corporations were not liable to beneficiaries for the negligence of agents or servants, except "perhaps, where there has
been a failure of reasonable care in their selection," 60 the court
held that the plaintiff could not recover.6 ' With respect to the
plaintiff's other allegation-that the church had failed to exercise
reasonable care in hiring and retaining an incompetent employee-the Bianchi court made it clear that there was no evidence of negligent hiring and that, accordingly, the issue was not
being considered. 6 2
50 Simmons, 112 N.J.L. at 130-31, 170 A. at 238. The plaintiffs in Simmons were
involved in an automobile accident with a truck owned by the defendant church and
driven by one of the defendant's employees. Id.
51 See id. at 132-33, 170 A. at 238-39.
52 Id. at 133, 170 A. at 239.
53 See Bianchi v. South Park Presbyterian Church, 123 NJ.L. 325, 8 A.2d 567
(1939).
54 123 NJ.L. 325, 8 A.2d 567 (1939).
55 Id. at 329, 8 A.2d at 568-69.
56 Id. at 328, 8 A.2d at 568.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 327, 8 A.2d at 568.
59 See id. at 332-33, 8 A.2d at 570-71.
60 Id. at 330, 8 A.2d at 569.
61 Id. at 334, 8 A.2d at 571.
62 Id. at 332, 8 A.2d at 570.
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In Fields v. Mountainside Hospital,63 the plaintiff was injured
when a wooden frame that was attached to his hospital bed
broke.6 4 One count of his complaint alleged that the defendant
hospital was under a duty both to furnish equipment that was fit
for its intended purpose and to provide competent personnel to
inspect and maintain that equipment.6 5 The Fields court-a
county trial court-opined that that count was based both on
"administrative negligence ' 6 6 and on negligent hiring.6 7 Administrative negligence was described as "the failure to furnish
proper equipment," whereas negligent hiring referred to the failure to exercise reasonable care in selecting qualified employees. 6 8 After noting that the issue had not previously been decided
in New Jersey,6 9 the Essex County court refused to dismiss the
entire complaint, holding that a cause of action could be maintained against a charity if it was based either on negligent hiring
or on administrative negligence.70
Two years later, the contrary result was reached by another
NewJersey trial court. 7 1 In Fairv. Atlantic City Hospital,72 an Atlantic County court surveyed New Jersey's common law and concluded that charitable immunity was a matter of public policy
' 73
and, with respect to beneficiaries, immunity was "absolute.
22 N.J. Misc. 72, 35 A.2d 701 (Essex County Ct. 1944).
Id. at 74, 35 A.2d at 703. The defective apparatus was a "Balkan frame" that
the plaintiff used to pull himself up in bed. Id.
65 Id. at 78, 35 A.2d at 704. The count referred to is the fifth count of the plaintiff's complaint. Id. The complaint also contained counts based on breach of an
implied contract, id. at 73-74, 35 A.2d at 702, and breach of an express contract. Id.
at 75, 35 A.2d at 703.
66 Id. at 78, 35 A.2d at 704. The court explained that "administrative negligence" referred to carelessness in providing proper equipment-the breach of a
"non-delegable duty on the part of the hospital." Id.
63
64

67 Id.
68 See id. As one court explained, "a charitable institution . . . is liable for failure to furnish proper equipment if damages result from that failure. This is what is
called administrative negligence, as distinct from failure to exercise due care in the
selecting of proper physicians and nurses." Miller v. Sisters of St. Francis, 5 Wash.
2d 204, 209, 105 P.2d 32, 35 (1940), quoted in Fields, 22 N.J. Misc. at 78-79, 35 A.2d
at 705.
69 Fields, 22 N.J. Misc. at 77, 35 A.2d at 704.
70 See id. at 77-80, 35 A.2d at 704-05.
71 Fair v. Atlantic City Hosp., 25 N.J. Misc. 65, 50 A.2d 376 (Atlantic County Ct.
1946).
72 25 NJ. Misc. 65, 50 A.2d 376 (Atlantic County Ct. 1946).
73 Id. at 70, 50 A.2d at 379. The Faircourt stated that "the exemption from suit
of a beneficiary is a positive and absolute rule in New Jersey." Id. As a matter of
public policy, this rule was said to be "fixed by judicial pronouncement." Id.
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Without mentioning negligent hiring,14 the Fair court held that
no "logical distinction" could be drawn between administrative
75
negligence and negligence on the part of an agent or servant.
Thus, the court opined that charitable immunity encompassed all
types of negligent behavior.7 6
In 1949, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court was confronted by a plaintiff who urged several exceptions
to the charitable immunity doctrine.7 7 In Woods v. Overlook Hospital Association,7 8 the plaintiff first claimed that immunity should be
withheld if there had been either gross negligence or administrative negligence-"negligence by the [charity] in furnishing supplies to its employees. '79 With respect to that contention, the
court held that such an exception was unsupported by prior case
law.8" The plaintiff also argued that a charitable institution
should be subject to liability if the plaintiff's injury resulted from
its "failure to exercise reasonable care in the selection of its employees.""1 Considering this contention separately from the argument in favor of an administrative negligence exception, the
court stated, "[a]ssuming the existence of such [an] exception
I we find nothing in the evidence which renders it applicable." 8 2 Thus, like the court in Bianchi," the appellate division in
Woods avoided the issue of whether an exception to charitable immunity existed for negligent hiring by finding that no evidence of
74 Initially, the court noted that the complaint alleged failure "to provide competent and efficient administrators, servants and agents" to procure proper equipment and the actual use of improper equipment in treating the plaintiff. Id. at 66,
50 A.2d at 377. The court, however, spoke only of "administrative negligence" in
the course of its opinion, stressing the argument that there could be no valid distinction between the negligence of an employee and the negligence of a manager or
administrator. See, e.g., id.at 70-71, 50 A.2d at 379 (quoting several extrajurisdictional authorities).
75 Id. at 70, 50 A.2d at 379; see also id. at 71-72, 50 A.2d at 380 (" 'As a matter of
public policy, no distinction based upon logic or expediency can be made between
administrative and non-administrative acts.' ") (quoting Stearn v. Association of
Bar, 154 Misc. 71, 75, 276 N.Y.S. 390, 394 (Sup. Ct. 1934)).
76 See supra note 75.
77 Woods v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n, 6 N.J. Super. 47, 50-51, 69 A.2d 742, 744
(App. Div. 1949).
78 6 N.J. Super. 47, 69 A.2d 742 (App. Div. 1949).
79 Id. at 50, 69 A.2d at 744.
80 Id. (citing Fair). In addition, the court found no evidence of gross or administrative negligence in the case before it. Id.
81 See id.
82 Id. at 50-51, 69 A.2d at 744 (citing Bianchi, 123 N.J.L. at 332, 8 A.2d at 570,
for the implication that an exception for negligent hiring may in fact exist).
83 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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such conduct had been presented to the court. 84
A few years later, in Jones v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic
Church,8 5 the New Jersey Supreme Court found occasion to comment on the administrative negligence exception to the charitable immunity doctrine.8 6 In Jones, the plaintiff was a twelve-yearold-child who had been injured by a fellow student while attending the defendant's parochial school.8 7 The plaintiff sued the defendant church, alleging that the classroom instructor, as an
agent of the defendant, had breached his duty of care.8 8 In response to the plaintiff's assertion that charitable immunity
should not be extended to acts that constitute administrative
negligence, the Jones court, in dicta, stated that recognition of
such an exception would "modify the established common law
rule in [New Jersey]." ' 9 Using language reminiscent of that employed by the Fair court, 90 the Jones court added, "[t]here can be
no logical distinction between the tortfeasors when all act under
the charitable corporation. The corporation acts, through its servants or agents, whether they be directors, trustees or instructors.''91 The court then addressed the primary issue before itwhether a genuine issue of fact existed with respect to the defendant's status as a charitable institution.9 2 Concluding that it
did not, the summary judgment order in favor of the defendant
was affirmed.9 3
Soon after Jones was decided, the doctrine of charitable immunity fell into disfavor in New Jersey.9 4 Following the lead of
84 See Woods, 6 N.J. Super. at 51, 69 A.2d at 744 (no evidence that hospital authorities failed to exercise reasonable care in selecting employee who caused plaintiff's injury).
85 7 N.J. 533, 82 A.2d 187, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 886 (1951).
86 Id. at 538, 82 A.2d at 189.
87 Id. at 535, 82 A.2d at 188.
88 Id. at 535-36, 82 A.2d at 188.
89 Id. at 538, 82 A.2d at 189.
90 Compare text accompanying infra note 91 with Fair, 25 N.J. Misc. at 70-72, 50
A.2d at 379-80.
91 Jones, 7 N.J. at 538, 82 A.2d at 189 (citing Fair; Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham
Hosp., 66 Mass. 235, 126 N.E. 392 (1920)).
92 See id.
93 Id. at 540, 82 A.2d at 190.
94 See, e.g., Lokar v. Church of the Sacred Heart, 24 N.J. 549, 569, 133 A.2d 12,
23 (1957) (Jacobs, J., dissenting); id. at 569-70, 133 A.2d at 24 (Wachenfeld, J.,
concurring); Lindroth v. Christ Hosp., 21 N.J. 588, 590-91, 123 A.2d 10, 11 (1956);
Rafferzeder v. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp., 33 N.J. Super. 19, 2223, 109 A.2d 296, 298 (App. Div. 1954), certif. granted, 17 N.J. 557, 112 A.2d 317
(1955); see also Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 26-27, 141 A.2d
273, 275 (1958).
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several other jurisdictions, 9 5 the New Jersey Supreme Court finally abolished the doctrine in a trilogy of cases decided on the
same day in 1958.96 In Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary,9 7
the supreme court declared that "times and circumstances have
changed," and that the law of charitable immunity as it existed
did not "faithfully represent[] current notions of rightness and
fairness."' 98 Accordingly, the court held that when a person was
injured as a result of a charitable organization's negligent conduct, justice and equity required that there "be a basis for recovery without regard to whether the defendant [was] a private
charity." 9 9 Within a week, however, charitable immunity was reinstated statutorily by the Legislature. 0 0 Subsequent judicial de95 See Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 33-35, 141 A.2d 276,
278-80 (1958) (citing and discussing rejection of charitable immunity by other jurisdictions). Perhaps the foremost opinion advocating the abolition of charitable
immunity was written by Justice Rutledge when he was a judge for the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942). As Justice Brennan
noted in Lindroth v. Christ Hosp., 21 N.J. 588, 123 A.2d 10 (1956), even Dean
Prosser was impressed by the persuasiveness ofJustice Rutledge's opinion:
In the recently published second edition of his handbook on the law of
torts Dean Prosser comments that the law conferring this immunity 'is
undergoing rapid change,' largely influenced by the 1942 decision of
the late Mr. Justice Rutledge in [Hughes]. . . .That 'devastating opinion,' says Dean Prosser, 'reviewed all of the arguments in favor of the
immunity and demolished them so completely as to change the course
of the law,' and was followed by 'a flood of recent decisions holding that
a charity is liable for its torts to the same extent as any other defend-

ant. . .

.'

[The Dean] concludes, 'The immunity of charities is clearly in

full retreat.'
Lindroth, 21 N.J. at 590-91, 123 A.2d at 11 (citations omitted), quoted in Schultz, 95
N.J. at 536, 472 A.2d at 534.
96 See Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958)
(abolishing common law doctrine of charitable immunity); Dalton v. St. Luke's
Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 24-25, 141 A.2d 273, 274 (1958) (making clear that
abolition in Collopy, which concerned a hospital, applies equally .to churches and
similar institutions); Benton v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 27 N.J. 67, 69, 141
A.2d 298, 299 (1958).
97 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958).
98 Id. at 39, 141 A.2d at 282.
99 Id. In conclusion, the Colopy majority stated:
The primary function of the law is justice and when a principle of the
law no longer serves justice it should be discarded;. . .[charitable immunity] runs counter to widespread principles which fairly impose liability on those who wrongfully and negligently injure others; it operates
harshly and disregards modern concepts of justice and fair dealing; it
has been roundly and soundly condemned here and elsewhere and the
time has come for its elimination .

. ..

Id. at 47-48, 141 A.2d at 287.
100 Schultz, 95 N.J. at 536-37, 472 A.2d at 535. For the pertinent text of N.J.
ANN. § 2A:53A-7, see supra note 18.

STAT.
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cisions made it clear that the Legislature had intended to
reinstate the common law doctrine exactly as it had existed prior
to its abolition.' 0 '
Acknowledging that interpretation as law, the Schultz majort°2
ity
began its analysis by focusing on those exceptions to charitable immunity which would have been recognized under New
Jersey's common law doctrine immediately prior to its abolition
in 1958.103 Writing for the court, Justice O'Hern, cognizant of
the existence of an exception for strangers or non-beneficiaries,
proceeded to address the plaintiffs' contention that a common
law exception for negligent hiring existed as well.' °4 While admitting that the trial court in Fields had recognized such an exception, the majority opined that Fields had been discredited by the
supreme court in Jones.'0 5 Accordingly, the majority concluded
that "it simply was not true that administrative negligence, also
hiring, was an exception to charitable
called negligent
' 06
immunity." 1
Justice O'Hern next rejected the notion advanced by the dissent that because the Charitable Immunity Act refers only to
"negligence" on the part of an agent or servant, the statutory
immunity is not applicable when the servant's tort is intentional.1 0 7 According to the majority, such an argument would
render a charity more vulnerable to liability than private entities. ' 8 Finally, in response to a rhetorical question,' 0 9 the court
noted that, in Jones, an instructor's negligent supervision did not
101 Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart Church, 74 N.J. Super. 532, 535-36, 181 A.2d

787, 789 (App. Div.) ("That the Legislature did not intend to expand, modify, or
alter in any way the span of the pre-existing immunity seems apparent from the
wording of the statute."), certif. denied, 38 N.J. 305, 184 A.2d 419 (1962).
102 Joining Justice O'Hern in the majority opinion were Justice Clifford, Justice
Garibaldi, and ChiefJustice Wilentz. Schultz, 95 N.J. at 539, 472 A.2d at 536.
103 Id. at 533-34, 472 A.2d at 533. Finding that "the Legislature crystallized the
law as of 1958," the majority stated that its role was "to carve out of the statute
those exceptions that would have been then recognized." Id.
104 See id. at 534, 472 A.2d at 533.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 535-36, 472 A.2d at 533-34. For the specific language used in the Act,
see supra note 18.
108 Schultz, 95 N.J. at 535 & n.l, 472 A.2d at 534 & n. 1.
109 As to the dissent's argument that immunity is unavailable when the employee's act is intentional, the majority asks: "Would not the same logic also apply
had the sexual crime been committed by an unsupervised fellow student[?]" Id. at
535, 472 A.2d at 534. Answering its own question, the majority responded, "[y]et
in Jones, the negligent failure to avert the commission of an intentional act by a
fellow student did not impose liability." Id.
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lead to liability when a student was injured by the intentional act
of a classmate."10
Although the Schultz majority was sympathetic to the desire
to find an exception to the Act, it stated that legislative intent
clearly dictated a contrary result."' After noting that the Legislature had focused on the economic consequences of immunity
versus liability, 1 2 the court remarked, "[w]e need not, then, theorize about whether liability for negligent hiring or administrative negligence advances the purposes of charitable immunity as
it developed at common law, since the Legislature has 'explicitly
fix[ed] the State's policy.' "s13 Emphasizing that the statute is to
the majority exbe construed liberally in favor of immunity,'
plained that it was powerless to modify the law in accordance
with its own view of public policy. 115 In conclusion, the court declared, "we find that the act charged against the charity here is
negligence in hiring. Under New Jersey's' Charitable Immunity
Act a charity is not liable for negligence.""16
The dissent, written by Justice Handler," 7 began by considering the threshold issue of whether institutions in general can
18
be held liable for the intentional wrongs of their employees."
The dissent observed that in Di Cosala v. Kay," 9 the supreme
court had expressly held that a cause of action existed for " 'the
negligent hiring or retention of an incompetent, unfit or dangerous employee.' "120 Because the plaintiffs theory of liability was
clearly valid, Justice Handler turned to the issue of whether the
defendant, on the basis of its status as a charitable entity, could
110 Id.; see also supra note 108. For a criticism of this analogy, see infra note 168.

111 See Schultz, 95 N.J. at 536-37, 472 A.2d at 534-35.
112 Id. at 537, 472 A.2d at 535.
113 Id. (quoting Collopy, 27 N.J. at 41, 141 A.2d at 283).
114 In support of this contention, the Schultz majority quoted from N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:53A-10, which provides that New Jersey's Charitable Immunity Act
shall be deemed to be remedial and shall be liberally construed so as to
afford immunity to the said corporations, societies and associations
from liability as provided herein in furtherance of the public policy for
the protection of nonprofit corporations, societies and associations organized for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes.
Schultz, 95 N.J. at 537-38, 472 A.2d at 535 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-10).
115 See Schultz, 95 N.J. at 539, 472 A.2d at 536.
116

Id.

117 Joining Justice Handler in the dissent were Justice Schreiber and Justice
Pollock.
118 See Schultz, 95 N.J. at 540-41, 472 A.2d at 536-37 (Handler, J., dissenting).
119 91 N.J. 159, 450 A.2d 508 (1982).
120 Schultz, 95 N.J. at 540, 472 A.2d at 537 (Handler, J., dissenting) (quoting
Di Cosala, 91 N.J. at 174, 450 A.2d at 516).

1985]

NOTES

919

claim absolute immunity.12'
Following general principles of statutory construction, the
dissent first attempted to interpret the Act according to its plain
meaning. 1 2 Concentrating on the language itself, 123 Justice
Handler thought it clear that the statute applies solely to "negligent" conduct. 124 Furthermore, the dissent reasoned that because the statute simply reinstated the common law doctrine, "it
is readily inferable that the Legislature did not intend to provide
. . . an immunity covering aggravated forms of wrongful
12 5
conduct."'

Assuming for the sake of argument that the immunity statute
could be viewed as ambiguous, 2 6 however, the dissent deemed it
appropriate to examine the common law rule in order to interpret the statute in a manner consistent with the Legislature's intent. 2 7 Justice Handler noted that New Jersey's common law
doctrine of charitable immunity was founded upon public policy. 28 Moreover, the dissent reasoned that "[b]ecause the statute
codifie[d] the common law, the concepts of public policy that
generated the common law rule, including their inherent capacity
to change over time, were presumably imported by the Legislature into the immunity statute." 129
After deeming public policy to be relevant, the dissent emphasized the general sentiment against "carv[ing] out a legal haven for willful and intentional misconduct."'' " Justice Handler
cited cases from other jurisdictions ' to support his conclusion
121 Id. at 541, 472 A.2d at 537 (Handler, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 542, 472 A.2d at 538 (Handler, J., dissenting).

See supra note 18.
Schultz, 95 NJ. at 542, 472 A.2d at 538 (Handler, J., dissenting).
Id. at 543, 472 A.2d at 538 (Handler, J., dissenting).
The ambiguity was said to arise due to a difference in phraseology between
the two clauses of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7. The first clause confers immunity
from liability resulting "from the negligence of any agent or servant" of the charitable institution; the second clause states that the immunity does not extend to a nonbeneficiary who "suffer[s] damage from the negligence of such [charitable] institution or of its agent or servants." Id. The Schultz majority explained that the second
clause might "recognize[] a difference between the negligence of agents and servants and the negligence of the [charitable] entity itself." Schultz, 95 N.J. at 543-44,
472 A.2d at 538.
127 Schultz, 95 N.J. at 545, 472 A.2d at 539 (Handler, J., dissenting).
128 See id. at 547-48, 472 A.2d at 540-41 (Handler, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 546, 472 A.2d at 540 (Handler, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 548, 472 A.2d at 541 (Handler, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 548-49, 472 A.2d at 542 (Handler, J., dissenting) (quoting Jeffcoat v.
Caine, 261 S.C. 75, 77, 198 S.E.2d 258, 260 (1973) ("application of the immunity
doctrine in a case of intentional tort is not required by precedent, nor, we conclude,
123
124
125
126
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that immunity for intentional, tortious conduct would further no
legitimate social goal. 132 The dissent opined that the two general
ways in which a charitable organization can lose its immunitywhen the claimant is a stranger, 133 and when the charity is engaged in an activity that is unrelated to its charitable purpose' 34 -indicate that the availability of immunity is dependent
upon the nexus between the injured plaintiff and the institution's
beneficent object. 1 5 Because Coakley's "perverted" conduct in
the case at bar was so far removed from the charity's purpose,
any connection between the victim and the institution's beneficent object was completely destroyed.' 3 6 Accordingly, under its
public policy analysis, the dissent declared that "it [was] a misnomer to characterize the child as a beneficiary of the institution"
37
and the Charitable Immunity Act, therefore, was inapplicable.
Justice Handler also disagreed with the majority's assessment that an exception for negligent hiring did not exist at common law. 138 After noting that both the McDonald and D'Amato
decisions had implied that a charity was under a duty to exercise
care in selecting its agents, the dissent maintained that the issue
of whether a negligent hiring exception existed was at best un39
resolved at the time that common law immunity was abolished.
Conceding that dicta in Jones indicated that immunity encomby reason or justice"); Maniaci v. Marquette Univ., 50 Wis. 287, 296, 184 N.W.2d
168, 176 (1971) ("Defendants have failed to point out any rule of this jurisdiction
or any other where an exception has ever been created to relieve charitable institutions of the intentional torts of their servants . . . .No policy reasons are urged by
defendants and none occur to us .... ")).
132 Id. at 549, 472 A.2d at 541-42 (Handler, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 550, 472 A.2d at 542 (Handler, J., dissenting); see also Simmons, 112
N.J.L. at 132-33, 170 A. at 238-39.
134 Schultz, 95 N.J. at 550, 472 A.2d at 542 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citing Kasten
v. Y.M.C.A., 173 N.J. Super. 1, 412 A.2d 1346 (App. Div. 1980); Pomeroy v. Little
League Baseball, 142 N.J. Super. 471, 362 A.2d 39 (App. Div. 1976)).
135 See id. at 551, 472 A.2d at 542 (Handler, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 552, 472 A.2d at 543 (Handler, J., dissenting).
137 Id. The dissent exclaimed,
[tihe predicates for charitable immunity do not exist in this case. The
sexual exploitation of an innocent child by a perverted employee destroys any vestige of a beneficent nexus between the charity and its victim. In this tragic and evil setting, it is a misnomer to characterize the
child as a beneficiary of the institution. Further, the heinous character
of the conduct totally negates any possibility of achieving a charitable
end.
Id.
138 See id.
139 Id. at 552-54, 472 A.2d at 543-44 (Handler, J., dissenting).
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passed acts of administrative negligence, 40 Justice Handler
pointed out that the Jones court did not consider an exception for
the "specific tort of 'negligent hiring.' "141 Consequently, the dissent concluded that "[i]f history and precedent [do] not clearly
supply the answer to whether there was an exception for negligent hiring at common law, then the answer must be found
through the conscientious application of reasons grounded in
public policy as presently perceived."' 4 2 Because the careless selection of employees impedes a charity's ability to benefit the
public, that kind of "[m]anagerial negligence" was said to "defeat[] the essential purpose" of exempting charitable entities
from having to pay damages. 4 3 The dissent therefore asserted
that an exception for negligent hiring should have been recognized under the immunity statute.' 4 4
Construction of the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act
presents a unique legal perplexity. Because the judiciary has
held that the Act was intended to resurrect the common law doctrine without expansion or modification, 14 5 the significance of the
statute's plain language is necessarily denigrated; 146 the common
law is automatically relevant to any interpretation. Therefore,
statutory construction must ultimately reconcile the language of
the Act with the status of the decisional law prior to its
enactment.
Actual tort immunity is conferred upon charitable institutions by the first clause of the Charitable Immunity Act.' 4 7 That
portion of the statute reads as follows:
No nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes shall, except as is hereinafter set forth, be liable
to respond in damages to any person who shall suffer damage
from the negligence of any agent or servant of such corporation, society or association, where such person is a beneficiary,
to whatever degree, of the works of such nonprofit corporaId. at 555, 472 A.2d at 544-45 (Handler, J., dissenting).
Id., 472 A.2d at 545 (Handler, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 556, 472 A.2d at 545 (Handler, J., dissenting).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart Church, 74 N.J. Super. 532, 535-36, 181 A.2d
787, 789 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 38 N.J. 305, 184 A.2d 419 (1962).
146 Indeed, if the statute truly revitalized the common law without modification, it
could be argued that the precise language of the statute itself is meaningless.
147 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7.
140
141
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tion, society or association .... 148
The statute speaks of "damage from the negligence of any agent or
servant."' 4 9 The underlying question presented to the Schultz court
was whether the injury to Christopher Schultz-caused concurrently
by an employee's intentional tort and by the negligent hiring of that
employee-properly fell within the statutory language. Because any
construction of the statute is inextricably linked to prior case law,
one must also ask if a common law exception existed for the negli50
gent act of hiring an unfit or dangerous employee.'
The majority, citingJones and Fair, concluded that such an exception did not exist.' 5 ' Both of those cases, however, never addressed the specific issue of failure to exercise care in selecting
employees; they stated only that an exception did not exist for "administrative negligence." ' 52 Thus, by relying on Jones and Fair, the
Schultz majority explicitly assumed that administrative negligence
and negligent hiring were synonymous at common law.' 53 Moreover, the majority's conclusion implies that both Jones and Fair were
correct in failing to draw a distinction between the negligent act of
an employee and the negligent hiring of an employee.
SinceJones simply adopted the language and the conclusions of
Fair,'5 4 this analysis will focus on the latter case. If the court in Fair
did not intend to include negligent hiring within its definition of
administrative negligence, the majority's analysis in Schultz would be
patently erroneous. 155 If the contrary were true, because Fair never
mentioned the careless selection of an employee, it could have been
56
distinguished nevertheless based upon this linguistic deficiency.'
The essence of the rationale in Fairwas that there could be no logical
distinction between the negligent act of an agent or servant and the
57
negligent act of an individual fulfilling an administrative duty.1 If
148

Id.

149
150

Id.

See, e.g., Schultz, 95 N.J. at 534, 472 A.2d at 533; id. at 552, 472 A.2d at 543
(Handler, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 534, 472 A.2d at 533.
152 SeeJones, 7 N.J. at 538, 82 A.2d at 189; supra notes 73 & 74 and accompanying
text (discussing Fair).
153 Schultz, 95 N.J. at 534, 472 A.2d at 533 (referring to administrative negligence

as "also called negligent hiring").
154

CompareJones, 7 N.J. at 538, 82 A.2d at 189 (citing Fair) with Fair,25 N.J. Misc.

at 70-72, 50 A.2d at 379-80.
155 The error results because the Schultz majority obviously did include negligent
hiring within its definition of administrative negligence. See supra note 153 and ac-

companying text.
156 Cf. Schultz, 95 N.J. at 555, 472 A.2d at 544-45 (distinguishing Jones).
157 Fair, 25 N.J. Misc. at 70-72, 50 A.2d at 379-80.

19851

NOTES

923

that administrative function is the selection of a qualified employee,
however, such a conclusion becomes completely fallacious.
Initially, it should be noted that Fair ignored numerous statements in prior New Jersey case law, which not only recognized a
distinction, but also implied that immunity did not extend to carelessness in the selection of agents.' 5 8 When the D'Amato court first
established charitable immunity in New Jersey, it specified that it
was not deciding whether immunity would be available "if carelessness were shown in the selection of the agent responsible for the
injury."' 5 9 In addition, D'Amato relied on McDonald which made the
careful selection of agents a condition precedent to a grant of immunity.160 Moreover, in Simmons, the Court of Errors and Appeals
stated that "to acquiesce in the careless selection of servants" would
be "repugnant to one's sense ofjustice. '"161 After noting the general
rule of immunity, the Bianchi court also suggested that an exception
for negligent hiring might exist. 162 In contrast to Fair,each of these
decisions implicitly recognized a substantive reason for considering
negligent hiring as an issue distinct from the negligent act of an
employee.
In addition to ignoring the foregoing cases, the Fair court failed
to recognize that negligent hiring can indeed be logically distinguished from the negligent act of an employee. First, the negligent
act of an employee serves as a more direct cause of injury. In contrast, negligent hiring involves an intervening tort committed by an
incompetent or dangerous employee. In terms of apparent blameworthiness, an employee's act is representative of his personal being. The tort of negligent hiring, however, is a manifestation of the
operation of the charity. Second, negligent hiring breeds injury.
Unlike an isolated incident of negligence on the part of an employee, carelessness in such an administrative capacity has the potential to affect adversely the many persons who come in contact
with the charitable organization. This increased potential for harm,
and society's corresponding need for deterrence, serves to distinguish negligent hiring from simple employee negligence.
158

See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.

159 D'Amato, 101 N.J.L. at 65, 127 A. at 341.

160 McDonald, 120 Mass. at 436; see also DAmato, 101 N.J.L. at 65, 127 A. at 341
("Like the Massachusetts court in the earlier case of McDonald ... we are not required in this decision to go so far as to hold that a charitable corporation . . .
might not be liable . . . if carelessness were shown in the selection of the agent
responsible for the injury.").
161 Simmons, 112 N.J.L. at 133, 170 A. at 329.
162 See Bianchi, 123 N.J.L. at 330, 8 A.2d at 569; see also supra text accompanying
notes 60-62.
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Another significant issue raised in Schultz relates to the fact that
Coakley's conduct constituted an intentional tort. As recognized by
both the majority and the dissent in Schultz, New Jersey's common
law doctrine of charitable immunity was grounded on public policy. 163 Because the policy considerations surrounding an intentional
injury differ substantially from those related to a negligent injury,
the dissent maintained that immunity should be unavailable when
the direct cause of injury is an intentional act. 164
Contrary to the majority's objections, 16 5 the dissent's position
does not "present[] problems of consistency," nor does it make
charitable institutions "more vulnerable" to liability than private
corporations. If the suit against the charity is not based on negligent hiring, the charity would be treated as any ordinary business,
i.e., the court would determine if the intentional tort occurred
within the scope of the employment. 166 If the suit is based on negligent hiring, liability would turn on whether such negligence was a
legal cause of the plaintiffs injury. 167
The dissent was correct in noting the significance of Coakley's
willful conduct. 168 Given the edict that the immunity statute was not
intended to expand the common law, 16 9 the failure of the Schultz
majority to note the absence of any prior case granting immunity
from an intentional injury was shortsighted. The majority's statement that the act complained of was simply "negligence" in hiring,'70 ignores the fact that the injury to the Schultzes resulted from
two tortious acts-one negligent and one intentional. Similarly ignored by such a position is society's increased interest in the prospective prevention of intentional harm.
163 Schultz, 95 N.J. at 545-48, 472 A.2d at 539-41 (Handler, J., dissenting); see id.
at 539, 472 A.2d at 536.
164 See id. at 548-52, 472 A.2d at 541-43 (Handler, J., dissenting). The dissent's

argument therefore suggests that the statutory phrase, "damage from the negligence of any agent or servant," see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7, does not include a
situation in which damage is proximately caused by the intentional tort of an employee of the charity (without regard to whether or not the negligence of another
agent also contributed to the injury).
165 Schultz, 95 N.J. at 535, 472 A.2d at 534.
166 See, e.g., Gibson v. Kennedy, 23 N.J. 150, 154, 128 A.2d 480, 482 (1957).
167 See DiCosala, 91 N.J. at 173-74, 450 A.2d at 516 (explaining elements necessary to establish tort of "negligent hiring").
168 The majority's analogy toJones-where liability was not found despite the intentional tort by the plaintiffs classmate-does not weaken this position. In Jones,
unlike Schultz, the intentional tort was not committed by an agent or employee of
the charity. In light of this obvious distinction, the majority's statement is
pointless.
169 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
170 Schultz, 95 N.J. at 539, 472 A.2d at 536.
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As a general comment, one cannot help but conclude that the
Schultz majority has expanded the scope of charitable immunity in
New Jersey. Such a thought is especially distasteful in light of the
apparent lack of justification for the doctrine.' 7 1 In contemporary
society, many charitable organizations have grown into corporate
conglomerates more than capable of spreading liability risks
through insurance. If a so-called charity cannot survive economically while compensating victims for unwarranted injury, then better
that such an entity should cease to exist. 172 Charitable immunity
may be understandable as a device to ensure that the philanthropic
values of nonprofit organizations survive against competing economic claims. However, when an individual is made to suffer without compensation, by an organization whose existence is predicated
upon just or egalitarian principles, the continued existence of such
an organization manifests a hypocritical favoritism which is neither
charitable nor socially profitable. Simply put, "men must be just
before they are generous." 173
DarleneJ.Pereksta
171 See, e.g., President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d
810 (D.C. Cir. 1942); see also supra note 95. See generally 10 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4921 (perm. ed. 1978) ("Today by far the majority of all jurisdictions in the United States have either completely repudiated the doctrine of charitable immunity or have modified and
weakened it materially.") (footnote omitted).
172 An opposite conclusion simply accords greater social worth to the philanthropy bestowed upon those persons benefited because of the charity's continued
existence, than to the good that would result by justly compensating victims of the
charity's tortious conduct. An economic rationale in support of charitable immunity therefore involves a decision to benefit one group of persons rather than another. Such a decision is without moral, social, or philosophical justification.
173 Collopy, 27 N.J. at 40, 141 A.2d at 283 (quoting Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29, 58
(1952)).

